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1. – Overview 
Rethinking Sovereign Debt explores how sovereign debt continuity –the rule that nations should 
repay debts even after a major regime change, irrespective of the legitimacy of the previous regime– 
became customary international law. In fact, the consensus approach is that debt should be repaid even 
if it is odious, say, because it was incurred by a tyrannical government that did not respect human 
rights, repressed oppositions, made a private use of borrowed funds, etc. Continuous debt repayment, 
irrespective of regime changes, is indeed the common practice that has earned the rank of a market 
principle in the eyes of scholars and financial investors. Odette Lienau shows instead that, far from 
being a market necessity, debt continuity is just the consequence of the historical prevalence of a statist 
theory of sovereignty according to which the debtor is the State, and any government that exerts the 
control of the territory is the State’s legitimate representative.  
Rethinking Sovereign Debt is more than a book on odious debt; in Lienau’s words “[the aim is] to 
explain the foundation for the norm of sovereign debt continuity…  to understand how the norm of 
sovereign debt continuity gained power in modern finance to the near exclusion of other possible 
approaches.” Lienau’s analysis is important because “The way in which we think and speak about debt 
continuity acts as a kind of global soft law, shaping expectations of appropriate action for borrowers 
                                                            
 Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass., 2014,  ISBN 9780674725065, pp. 344. 
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and lenders… it enables and promotes particular outcomes and make contrary approaches seem 
implausible.”   
Lienau combines international law, politics and economics to shed light on the historical and 
political determinants of the contemporary norm of debt continuity, arguing against continuity as an 
inevitable market principle. The focus is on regime changes more likely to result in odious debt claims, 
such as social revolutions rejecting the legitimacy of the previous regime or post-dictatorial 
democracies inheriting debt spent on corruption if not on the repression of dissent and opposition. The 
aim is to understand how contingent historical and political factors as well as financial market 
structures determined behavioral pathways that made the debt continuity approach prevail and 
consolidate over time. By showing that the norm of ‘debt repayment under all conditions’ is historically 
specific, and more nuanced views of repayment existed in the past, Lienau argues that alternative more 
flexible approaches were possible and could be invoked in the future to deal with the debt obligations 
of previous odious regimes. 
 
2. – Book Structure 
Lienau argues that the debt continuity rule depends on both the prevalence of a statist view of 
sovereignty and creditors’ coordination/cohesion. In fact, there exist other theories of sovereignty, 
which are discussed in Chapter 2, such as popular sovereignty, respect of internal laws or output 
oriented sovereignty, that would imply a more flexible approach to debt repayment. The conception of 
sovereignty and creditors’ cohesion determine the extent to which the norm of continuous repayment is 
dominant. More flexible notions of repayment emerge when democratic or legal visions of sovereignty 
challenge the dominant statist approach and when new lenders competing with old creditors provide 
defaulting governments with renewed access to financial resources. The case studies which follow the 
theoretical chapters provide specific examples of how these two factors interacted to determine 
repayment outcomes in historical episodes of major regime changes.   
More flexible approaches to debt repayment are present in post-World War I cases of Soviet Russia’s 
repudiation of Tsarist debt and Great Britain’s 1923 arbitration with Costa Rica, favored by new ideas 
of sovereignty based on Woodrow Wilson’s commitment to self-determination and constitutional 
government (Chapters 3 and 4). While odious debt claims of post-revolutionary Soviet Union were 
rejected and the country was excluded from international capital markets, US chief justice Taft ruled in 
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favor of Costa Rica in its dispute against Britain over the debt incurred by previous Tinoco’s 
dictatorship on the basis of violation of internal laws (consistently with a rule-of-law approach to 
sovereignty). By demonstrating the interest of US banks in financing the new regimes, and the decisive 
role of the US government in preventing banks from lending to Soviet Russia, Lienau argues that 
creditors can reasonably make reputational judgments in favor of post-repudiation lending and 
challenges the assumption of an inevitable negative reaction of finance to debt repudiation. 
Debt continuity reemerges as a strong norm immediately after World War II, at a time when lending 
to sovereigns was a shared monopoly between the US government and the World Bank (Chapter 5). 
The latter played an important role in consolidating the statist approach as it considered only economic 
reasons for its lending decisions, consistently with its Articles of Agreement that explicitly exclude a 
role for political considerations (see Section 10 Article IV). This ‘political neutrality” was partly 
motivated by the early dependence of the Bank on private financial markets for the funding of its 
financial operations and thus on the need to adopt similar practices. Yet, Lienaus’s vivid account of the 
Bank’s refusal to stop lending to Portugal and apartheid South Africa in the mid-1960s, despite the 
explicit request by the United Nations, is reminiscent of the grim origin of international debt finance. 
This system also conformed with the interests of newly independent States that found in the statist 
understandings of sovereignty an easy way to legitimate themselves in the international political arena.  
By the 1970s bank syndication had become the predominant method of private lending. The resulting  
interconnections of banks’ loans and risks favored a coordinated creditors’ common approach to the 
debt crisis and loan restructuring of the 1980s, that limited the space for non-statist claims about debt 
discontinuity (Chapter 6). This trend was, in turn, reinforced by the general debtor response that 
focused on broader inequities in the economic system rather than on arguments based on political 
discontinuity. Quite surprisingly even the revolutionary governments of Nicaragua, Iran, the 
Philippines, and South Africa ultimately acknowledged the debts of previous regimes despite their 
despotic or racist nature. This evidence, as discussed below, highlights how costly is repudiation 
compared to renegotiation and restructuring.  
Since the 1990s attention for the values of human rights and popular sovereignty, including claims to 
self-determination has intensified and even international economic organizations have adopted this 
language to some extent. These developments have helped bring ideas of odious debt into the light, as 
evidenced by the discussion in the Iraqi case. Although expectations of uniform repayment still 
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dominate, Lienau is confident that “the distance between conceptions of legitimate sovereign action in 
the political and financial realms may shrink in future years.” 
 
3. – Lessons for Economists 
Why should economists be interested in a book on odious debt written by a law professor? The first 
reason is that it provides a comprehensive and particularly rich analysis of historical episodes of debt 
default/repudiation associated with major regime changes. By combining knowledge of international 
law, politics and economics this review provides us with a wider perspective on sovereign debt issues 
and with new instruments to better understand debt default/repudiation issues and debtor-creditor 
relations.        
Important lessons can be learned from Lienau’s account of historical episodes of regime changes that 
could result in odious debt claims. Economists have long and still struggle to explain why sovereign 
debt exists given that sovereign indemnity prevents creditors to take legal actions against a defaulting 
borrower that refuses to repay. Panizza et al. (2009) review the main theories of the costs of debt 
default that should ensure repayments: exclusion from future credit; trade disruption; domestic costs 
due to financial sector failures and reputational/institutional damages. However, the empirical evidence 
casts serious doubts on the extent and relevance of such costs. Consistently with the seminal 
contribution of Grossman and Van Huyck (1988), costs may not be observed or be small because 
punishment in the form of reputational costs or trade sanctions is not exercised if defaults are 
‘excusable’, say, because of bad economic conditions and external circumstances. In the latter case 
creditors should be willing to renegotiate/restructure the debt. In other words, high default costs may 
never be observed, because they would play a role only “out of equilibrium” in deterring ‘not 
excusable’ default.  
While the enforcement mechanisms of sovereign debt repayment are not yet fully understood, Lienau 
shows that countries renegotiate and partially repay sovereign debt even when such debt is odious.   
She reminds us of the distinction between repudiation and default; while default is excusable and 
renegotiation is the norm, outright repudiation, even when principled on odious debt claims, is 
unacceptable by the international community of States, public and private financial institutions. 
Apparently, a similar conclusion is reached in a recent report by Buchheit et al. (2013): “repudiations 
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would be severely punished (and as a result, would never occur), while shocks to debt service capacity 
would lead to a corresponding adjustment in the debt burden without any punishment.”  
In fact, Lienau reports very few cases of principled repudiation over the last century: Soviet Russia’s 
repudiation of Tsarist debt; People’s Republic of China’s repeal of treaties, agreements and debts of 
previous regimes, and; socialist Cuba’s nationalization of foreign investments and repudiation of 
external debt. These deliberate actions resulted in an effective isolation of such countries from 
international relations besides their effective exclusion from international capital flows. Although it is 
fair to say that politics more than financial markets played a role in the breakdown of economic 
relations, the costs of repudiation are undeniable. The hardship that Cuba suffered from isolation in the 
aftermath of the revolution likely shaped the decision by the Sandinista government of Nicaragua to 
renegotiate rather than repudiate Somoza’s odious debt. The decision to restructure and partially repay 
external debt by other Latin American countries emerging from military dictatorships in the 1980s was 
based on similar grounds. In fact, in many other cases, from post-Marcos Philippines to Iran, from post-
apartheid South Africa to Iraq, acknowledging odious debt and renegotiating it at favorable terms were 
preferred actions as they involved lower economic (and political) costs than repudiation. For instance, 
the restructuring of Saddam Hussein’s debt led to an almost 90 percent haircut; probably, a better 
outcome than what Iraq would have achieved with selective repudiation. Moreover, even if we take 
Lienau’s argument that repudiation may not necessarily have reputational consequences for newly 
established governments and their creditworthiness, acknowledging the debt of past regimes ‘under all 
conditions’ is a an easy way for such governments to rapidly gain credibility in the international 
political arena.  
There is however another reason why governments tend to repay the debts of previous illegitimate 
regimes that transpires from Rethinking Sovereign Debt. The statist conception of sovereignty, that 
underpins the debt continuity norm, entails “the idea that the content of and changes in a State’s 
internal structure, interests, and popular support are irrelevant to its status as a legitimate sovereign and 
thus to its external relation” and, as a result, that lending, as any economic relation, should be void of 
political judgment. The current approach in modern finance that refuses political assessments and 
makes reputation depend only on repayment record is not only easier for private creditors but it also fits 
the interest of debtor governments that oppose any interference in their internal affairs and external 
limitations to their actions. 
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4. – Policy Considerations 
Although I am sympathetic to the idea of odious debt cancellation, I am less optimistic than Lienau 
about the possibility of a change in the practice of sovereign debt despite the increasing attention and 
sensibility to new theories of sovereignty in international law and politics. As the norm of debt 
continuity is rooted in the statist theory of sovereignty, it is unlikely that exceptions to the rule, no 
matter how well principled, will ever be adopted without a non-statist revision of sovereignty in 
international law and country relations. As long as governments maintain economic relations regardless 
of each other’s legitimacy, respect of internal laws and human rights, consistently with a statist 
recognition of their sovereignty, it will be difficult to oppose the validity of debt contracts that are 
entered into with similar expectations. 
From an economic perspective, the idea of debt discontinuity raises a number of issues. In particular, 
we should ask who would benefit and, more generally, what would be the welfare effects of odious 
debt cancellation?  There is no doubt that freeing new governments from the debt obligations of past 
illegitimate regimes is a worthy cause, but what matters most is preventing such regimes from taking 
advantage of external financing in the first place. For Cassese (1979) there is no doubt that the priority 
is to stop lending to odious governments. Debt write offs can help to achieve this goal because of their 
ex-ante implications for lending: the cancellation of debts incurred by illegitimate regimes would 
impose large losses on creditors and thus deter lending (unless very short term) to such regimes. The 
main benefit of writing off illegitimate debt, that Lienau does not realize, is to stop odious lending. 
However, to be an effective threat, odious debt cancellation must be credibly enforced. This would 
certainly be difficult in the case the decision had to be taken ex post because of the pressures from 
politics, debtors and creditors. The uncertainty surrounding court decisions would also adversely affect 
the functioning of international financial markets. Therefore, a clear legal definition  of odious debt is 
needed to enforce its cancellation and deter odious lending. Alternatively, as proposed by Jayachandran 
and Kremer (2006), an international agency or institution should be given the authority to 
decide/declare the odiousness, and thus the credit merit, of sovereign borrowers. Loans to odious 
regimes would not be prohibited but they would be sanctioned with ‘no right to repayment’. A system 
of loan sanctions in which ‘the rules of the game’ are known in advance would also favor a predictable 
functioning of financial markets and make creditors better off by removing the uncertainty about which 
loans would be considered odious ex post. For instance, as many regimes turn illiberal over time, 
sanctions would only apply to loans made after a declaration of sovereign illegitimacy, thus allowing to 
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separate legitimate lending from odious debt. Certainly, Lienau places an excessive confidence in the 
market ability to self-regulate so that loans would carry a repudiation premium increasing in the 
perceived odiousness of the debt.  
What characteristics would make lending illegitimate and thus prevent the accumulation of odious 
debt?  Rethinking Sovereign Debt suggests a wide range of odious government actions that go from the 
violation of fundamental human rights to the absence of civil liberties, from the exercise of illegitimate 
power to the infringement of national laws, from corruption to an use of borrowed funds contrary to 
public benefit.  Lienau suggests that different definitions of illegitimate debt may arise from alternative 
non-statist theories of sovereignty and that new customary law on debt continuity will eventually 
emerge from the interaction of state practice, courts’ ruling, activist actions and broader international 
relations but she is evasive about supporting any specific proposal.  
While we agree with Lineau that ex-post, with the benefit of hindsight, most cases of illegitimate 
debt are evident, and ruling for non-repayment would help to establish customary law, in many 
intermediate cases taking action is difficult in the absence of clear ex-ante definitions of illegitimate 
debt. As our discussion suggests, clear rules and/or loan sanctions are needed to stop lending to odious 
governments. In the end, the aim is not only to avoid burdening new governments with the debt of past 
odious regimes but preventing such regimes from receiving external financing. 
What definition of odious debt should then be adopted? Distinctions based on the use of borrowed 
funds, say, whether for public benefit or private interests, are not useful for a number of reasons. First 
of all, the aim to stop or sanction illegitimate lending calls for an ex ante determination of odious debt 
which immediately excludes definitions based on the use of borrowed funds as the latter can only be 
verified ex post.  There are however other reasons why outcome-oriented definitions of odious debt are 
unsatisfactory. In particular, the link between the borrowed funds and their uses is difficult to ascertain.  
Most loans, and especially bonds, are issued for deficit financing rather than targeted to specific 
projects. Furthermore, external resources are fungible in that, by financing needed investment, they 
may free resources for less noble uses. Finally, most infrastructure investments can later be used to 
odious ends, for example, to sustain war efforts. Financially supporting a criminal regime, even for 
roads, hospitals and schools, is tantamount to helping the regime’s consolidation and self-preservation 
(Bedjaoui 1977).  
If a debt can be deemed odious only in connection with the odious nature of the borrowing 
government, what requirements should a government satisfy to be a legitimate borrower, and be 
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creditworthy in the wider meaning of the term?  While answering this question goes beyond the 
purpose of Rethinking Sovereign Debt, it is certainly a relevant issue if we want to rethink responsible 
lending. Conventional wisdom suggests that compliance with fundamental human rights should be a 
minimum requirement for sovereign borrowing, more compelling and less uncertain than democratic 
legitimacy or respect of internal laws. This view seems to be shared by Bedjaoui (1977): “..any loan 
must be considered odious, if a regime, democratically elected or not, does not respect the fundamental 
principles of international law such as the fundamental human rights, the sovereignty of States, or the 
absence of the use of force.”   
Debt activists have long insisted on human rights compliance as an imperative condition for 
responsible lending, and, interestingly, a number of private banks have adopted guidelines for socially 
responsible lending –the ‘Equator Principles’– that, since 2013, include responsibilities for the respect 
of human rights.1  It is then remarkable that international economic institutions, in tune with their 
member States, have shied away from human rights conditionality. This suggests that the new attention 
to ideas of popular sovereignty, expanded claims to self-determination and human rights are mostly 
rhetoric, as sovereign governments continue to refuse any interference in their internal affairs. Indeed, 
they have not endorsed, so far, any initiative for human rights in sovereign lending that possibly 
restricts their access to financial markets. This resistance is not surprising if we realize that violations 
of human rights via torture are more widespread than we tend to believe2, and even less so when we 
consider interpretations of human rights that extend to the protection of people from arbitrary 
interference with their privacy and correspondence.3  In fact, most governments are a bit odious.   
 
 
  
                                                            
1 The Equator Principles, June 2013, are available at http://www.equator-principles.com/index.php/ep3  
2 Article 5 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, United Nations. According to Amnesty International 
(2014): “Over the past five years, Amnesty International has reported on torture and other ill-treatment in 141 
countries and from every world region.” 
3 Article 12 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, United Nations. 
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